Military expenditure and income distribution in South Korea

This paper attempts to investigate the long-run and the causal relationship between military expenditure and income distribution in South Korea for the period 1965–2011. Applying the bounds test approach to cointegration, we found a long-run relationship between military expenditure and the Gini coefficient with military expenditure having a positive and a statistically significant impact on income inequality. A 1% rise in military expenditure increased the Gini coefficient by 0.38%. Application of the lag-augmented causality test also reveals a unidirectional causality running from military expenditure to income inequality. The evidence seems to suggest that devoting more resources to the military sector may further worsen income inequality in South Korea.     

The Obama administration's phased-adaptive architecture: technological,operational and political issues

In 2009, the Obama administration announced a new missile defense strategy, termed a phased-adaptive architecture (PAA) focused primarily on countering the growing threat from theater ballistic missiles. The success of this strategy is predicated on the rapid development and fielding of successive increments of defensive capability in a manner adapted to the specific requirements for missile defenses in different regions of the world. The administration is committed to building a European regional missile defense system, the European PAA or EPAA between now and 2020. The first elements of the EPAA were deployed in late 2011. However, much progress is still required in order to reach the goals set for the PAA. This article addresses the technological, operational and political issues confronting the Obama administration in its efforts to make the PAA a reality.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.     

OF HAWKS AND DOVES

The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.     

The Problem of Weak Nuclear States

Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality.     

CHINA AND THE U.S. BEYOND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

China-U.S. cooperation over the most difficult security problem in Northeast Asia—the North Korean nuclear issue—in essence projects its bigger power game amid the tectonic shifts of Asian geopolitics. The nuclear issue affords a test case to gauge the future posture of China and the United States in East Asia and their partnership in that conflict-prone region. Approaches to resolving this issue must take into account the geopolitical realignment of Asia, Washington's reorientation of relations with its Asian allies, and China's rise as an influential regional player and the subsequent regional response. However, the long-standing mistrust between China and the United States is contributing to a lack of substantial progress in Korean nonproliferation efforts. The declared nuclear test by Pyongyang further put the denuclearization cooperation between China and the Unites States on the line. China-U.S. cooperation in denuclearizing Pyongyang may either produce lasting stability for the region or create ‘‘collateral damage,’’ with the North Korean issue paling in comparison.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

韩国军事改革探析

韩国自20世纪80年代以来积极推进系统性军事改革,特别是卢武铉政府的《国防改革基本计划2006-2020》,充分吸收先前改革经验教训,通过法制化实现了此后历届政府的继承与坚持,引领着韩军当前及未来的建设方向。韩国当前军事改革在主动适应国际新军事变革发展潮流的同时,充分结合自身实际,在作战思想、指挥体系、编制体制、国防管理等各领域均表现出较强的针对性,致力于实现部队的减员增效和均衡发展,推动自主国防建设,提升应对朝鲜军事威胁的能力。同时,韩军在改革过程中,也暴露作战能力受到质疑、军费预算跟进不足,兵源难以为继等系列问题,成为影响韩国军事改革实施进度和最终成效的不确定因素。